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Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare
Litigation and Beyond
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I. INTRODUCTION
The lawsuits challenging Obamacare’s1 individual mandate2 have exposed a rift
in federalism theory. On one side of the divide is a view that the national
government ought to intervene—and ought to be constitutionally permitted to
intervene—whenever the states are “separately incompetent”3 to regulate a particular
subject.4 According to this view, the primary purpose of the Constitution’s
enumeration of national powers is to authorize Congress to fix collective action
problems among the states.5 Borrowing from Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel’s article
of the same name, I refer to this view as “collective action federalism.”6 On the other
†
Peter Paul Career Development Professor and Associate Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law.
1
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA]. The moniker
“Obamacare” is one that has been associated with the law’s opponents, but I like the name better than
“PPACA” or “ACA” and will therefore use it despite arguing for the statute’s constitutionality.
2
See ACA § 1501 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2012)).
3
See Robert Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article
I, Section 8, 63 STAN . L. R EV. 115, 117 (2010) (quoting 2 THE R ECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
C ONVENTION OF 1787, at 131-32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
4
See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 M ICH. L. R EV. 1, 46-47 (2010); Patrick McKinley
Brennan, The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, and the Ends of Good Government: A Reply to
Professor Barnett, 159 U. PA. L. R EV . 1623 (2011); Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to
Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. R EV . 1825 (2011); Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail
Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/26/koppelman.html; Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence:
Collective Action Federalism and the Individual Mandate, 75 LAW & C ONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2012); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1723
(2011). See generally Sam Singer, Defending the Affordable Care Act: What the Justice Department
Can Learn from the Legal Academy, VA. REV., http://www.vareview.com/ContributorArticles/
Articles/AboutTheHealthCareLawsuits.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2012) (noting that most members of
the legal academy seem to be following a collective action theory of federalism in their defenses of
Obamacare).
5
See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3.
6
Id.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004477
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side of the divide is a view that federalism exists for reasons other than efficiency of
regulation and particularly that the Founders created the federal structure for the
protection of individual liberty.7 According to this view, there is inherent value to
state power that ought to be preserved against national encroachments.8 I refer to this
view as “libertarian federalism.” In the Obamacare litigation, believers in collective
action federalism generally support the individual mandate while believers in
libertarian federalism generally oppose it.9
This Article presents a standard cost-benefit theory to bridge the gap—to
reconcile the two competing theories of federalism. The cost-benefit theory is
premised on two basic views. First, federalism exists both to promote regulatory
efficiency and to protect individual liberty. That is, collective action federalism and
libertarian federalism both rest on sound foundations. Second, regulatory efficiency
always counsels in favor of national authority while individual liberty always
counsels in favor of state authority. Either collective action federalism or libertarian
federalism, if followed to its natural conclusion, would do away with federalism
altogether. Assuming, then, that federalism is worth preserving and that both views
rest on good foundations, the Supreme Court ought not to adopt one view to the
exclusion of the other.
Fortunately, it is quite possible to follow both views simultaneously by
optimizing the balance between the two. Under cost-benefit federalism, the inquiry
ought to weigh the efficiency losses of state action against the liberty losses of
national action and ought to choose the approach that maximizes the value—the
benefits minus the costs—in the distribution of governmental authority. That is, if
the libertarian costs of federalization outweigh its efficiency benefits, then Congress
ought to leave regulation to the states. But if the efficiency benefits outweigh the
libertarian costs, then Congress ought to regulate. Unlike the collective action and
libertarian theories, the cost-benefit approach allows for some generalizable
distinctions in the kinds of regimes that should fall to Congress and the kinds that
should fall to the states. Cost-benefit federalism does not argue monotonically for
national or state control. Indeed, the cost-benefit theory suggests a federalism line
that roughly tracks the current doctrinal distinction: the economic/noneconomic
distinction in the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause cases.10
That said, the simple account of the cost-benefit theory is too simple, for two
reasons. First, not all regulation is monopolistically state or national; many

7

See THE FEDERALIST NO . 51 (James Madison).
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010) [hereinafter Balkin,
Commandeering the People]; Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of Commerce, 2012
U. ILL. L. R EV . (forthcoming 2012); Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor
Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267
(2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/11/08/lawson&kopel.html; Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of
Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 2010 C ATO SUP. C T.
R EV. 239; Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: National Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems
Under Article I, Section 8 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 10-40, 2012), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1894737.
9
Compare Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 185 n.243, with Barnett, Commandeering the
People, supra note 8, at 582-83.
10
See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 131-34 (tracing the economic/noneconomic
distinction in the precedent); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH . L. R EV. 888 (2006) (describing the same distinction and comparing
it to the distinction for individual substantive rights, which is also generally an
economic/noneconomic distinction).
8

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004477
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regulatory regimes involve both levels of government.11 But while national action
can preserve state advantages, state action has a much harder time capturing national
advantages.12 Congress can (and frequently does) write national legislation that
preserves states’ ability to protect individual liberty (through either “cooperative
federalism” programs or narrowly preemptive national laws), but states rarely
surmount their collective action problems to engage in more-efficient coordinated
efforts.13 It might be quite rational, therefore, for courts and commentators to take a
less skeptical view of national claims to action than of state claims to action.
Second, the notion that the best approach to constitutional federalism would
optimize the balance between regulatory efficiency and individual liberty elides an
institutional competence problem. The courts are not institutionally capable of
calculating and enforcing the optimal federalist balance, but neither is Congress.
Information about the costs and benefits of regulation simply is unavailable.
Optimality is thus a theoretical first-best answer to federalism rather than a judicially
or legislatively administrable test. Nevertheless, the legislature’s greater democratic
legitimacy gives it a constitutionally relevant claim to supremacy on the federalism
question. Congress is structurally better suited than the courts to gather the
information that is available and to make legitimate decisions based on that
information. The courts therefore should and do defer to Congress’s rational
decisions.14 As long as Congress has not chosen a federalist balance that skews to an
extreme of efficiency at the cost of liberty (and the states have not asserted a power
that skews to an extreme of liberty at the cost of efficiency), the courts should not
intervene.
What about Obamacare? Under the cost-benefit approach I outline here, the
theoretical test for Obamacare’s federalism is whether the libertarian costs of
increasing the national government’s control over individual health insurance
purchases will outweigh the efficiency costs of the status quo ante’s level of state
control. Notably, that question is more complicated than the litigants and the courts
have made it seem. The analysis ought to incorporate a fuller understanding of the
balance that Congress actually struck in the statute as well as a fuller understanding
of the balance that existed before Obamacare’s passage. We ought not to pretend, as
many of the litigants and commentators have,15 that Obamacare represents a full
national takeover of health insurance regulation or that the pre-Obamacare world
was one of full state control. Of course, even with that more nuanced understanding,
it will be impossible to give any precise estimate to Obamacare’s true federalist
11
See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 M ICH. L. R EV . 813 (1998)
(discussing the phenomenon of cooperative federalism programs and the political economy of
intergovernmental relations within those programs).
12
See M ALCOLM M. FEELEY & E DWARD R UBIN , FEDERALISM : POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC
C OMPROMISE (2008) (noting that federalism and decentralization ought to be treated as separate
concepts and that national authority need not imply full centralization of decision-making); Abigail R.
Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in Health Care Regulation: The
Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN . J.L. & PUB . POL’Y 266, 278-79 (2011) (noting that
Medicare captures many advantages of state control by running policy experiments and decentralizing
authority to local fiscal intermediaries).
13
See Hills, supra note 11, at 858-71.
14
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (stating a “rational basis” test for review
of national regulations defended under the Commerce Clause).
15
See OBAMACARE : M ANDATORY SOCIALIZED M EDICINE , http://www.akdart.com/
obama184.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2012) (webpage containing many links to commentaries about
Obamacare).
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value. Both the statute’s efficiency gains and its liberty costs are impossible to
calculate because so many of the costs and benefits are insusceptible to standardized
measurement. In practice, then, the question of Obamacare’s federalism ought to be
whether the balance that Congress struck between efficiency and liberty is irrational.
If not, then the law ought to be upheld.
This Article argues that most commentators have exaggerated all three of the
relevant issues with Obamacare: its efficiency gains, its liberty costs, and its
departure from the status quo ante’s federalist balance. The collective action
problem with state insurance regulation is not as bad as scholars of collective action
federalism have argued; the liberty implications of the individual mandate are not as
extreme as scholars of libertarian federalism have argued; and the shift from state to
national power is not as significant as the litigants and courts have argued. Although
I do not make the strong claim that Obamacare reaches the optimal balance between
regulatory efficiency and individual liberty, I do make the weaker doctrinal claim
that Obamacare strikes an eminently rational federalist balance, which deserves
judicial deference.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II makes the case that both collective
action federalism and libertarian federalism rest on sound foundations but that either
theory taken alone would argue against federalism—in favor of either full national
or full state authority. That Part then argues that the first-best theory of federalism
would seek the optimal balance between these competing visions. Part II fleshes out
the two complicating factors in the simple version of cost-benefit federalism: the
frequent hybrid state-national strategies that Congress pursues and the impossibility
of discovering optimality with precision. Part III then makes the case for judicial
deference to Congress’s federalism. Part IV turns to Obamacare and argues that the
literature and the litigation alike have exaggerated the statute’s relevant federalism
implications, including its efficiency gains, its liberty costs, and its departure from
the status quo ante. Part IV also argues that Obamacare strikes a rational balance
between state and national power that ought to be preserved.
II. COST-BENEFIT FEDERALISM
Throughout the Obamacare litigation, two competing visions of federalism have
vied for supremacy. According to collective action federalism, Congress should be
empowered to address any problem that the states are separately incompetent to
address.16 If a regulatory regime suffers from interstate externalities (like adverse
selection and cost-shifting in health insurance markets, according to the advocates of
this theory), then Congress should be allowed to intervene.17 Under the competing
vision of federalism, libertarian federalism, the states should retain primary
regulatory authority because state power better preserves individual liberty.18
Especially if a regulatory regime imposes on individual autonomy in some new or
troubling way (as does Obamacare’s individual mandate, according to the advocates
of this theory), each state should remain free to reject the imposition. Although both
of these visions of federalism rest on legitimate theoretical foundations, each vision
taken alone would argue for the end of federalism. Collective action federalism
argues monotonically for national control while libertarian federalism argues
monotonically for state control. In order to capture the foundational correctness of
16

See Lash, supra note 8, at 2-3.
See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 12-13.
18
See Hills, supra note 10, at 904.
17
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both views, federalism doctrine ought to seek a balance between the two visions—
between the efficiency of national regulation and the liberty of state regulation.
This Part will demonstrate that the national government is better situated, from a
purely structural perspective, to capture regulatory efficiency while the state
governments are better situated, from the same purely structural perspective, to
preserve individual liberty—and that these structural capacities apply to every
regulatory regime. It will then make the case that efficiency and liberty should serve
as mutual constraints for one another and that the goal of a federal (rather than either
a purely central or a purely diffuse) system of government should be to optimize the
balance between the two values.
A. COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM
According to collective action federalism, Congress should be empowered to
address any regulatory problem that the states are “separately incompetent” to
solve.19 In elaborating this general theory of national power, Cooter and Siegel
articulate an “internalization principle”20 for determining which level of government
should be authorized to address a problem. In their view, the Constitution should
“assign power to the smallest unit of government that internalizes the effects of its
exercise.”21 As we shall see, however, the scope of that principle depends on
whether Cooter and Siegel mean “the smallest unit of government that internalizes
most of the effects of its exercise” or “the smallest unit of government that
internalizes all of the effects of its exercise.” If they intend the former (as they seem
to), then we need a theory for what constitutes most. How significant does an
interstate externality need to be before Congress may constitutionally intervene?
Cooter and Siegel provide no answer. If they intend the latter (which they seem not
to), then the theory argues for nationalization of all social and economic policy. All
such policy suffers from some interstate externalization because the citizenry is
freely mobile.
I will describe and model the problem of interstate externalities (the collective
action problem that defines collective action federalism) and will explain why the
theory needs some kind of limiting principle in order to be a theory of federalism
rather than a theory of nationalism. I will also provide two possible empirical limits
for the theory, both of which I find legally unsatisfying.
1. Interstate Externalities
The core problem that collective action federalism seeks to address is the
problem of regulatory spillovers between and among the states. To see this problem
in action, I will use the canonical example of interstate externalities that justify
national intervention: pollution. If Massachusetts, for example, undersupplies
pollution abatement, some of the effects of that choice will travel to other states
because some of the excess pollution will travel downstream to New Hampshire or
Rhode Island (and beyond). Acting alone, therefore, Massachusetts’s incentive to
punish polluters is incomplete.

19

See Lash, supra note 8, at 2-3.
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 137.
21
Id.
20
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We can express the problem with a simple model.22 Ideally, a government will
regulate up to the point that the social benefits of the regulation (cleaner air and
water) equal the social costs of the regulation (enactment and enforcement costs as
well as lost economic productivity from pollution reductions). The constraint, then,
is that a regulation should pass whenever:
SBr ≥ SCr
If some of the regulation’s benefits (some of the cleaner air and water) will travel to
a different governmental system (a neighboring state), then voters and legislators
will rationally spend less than the optimal amount of social cost (like time, effort,
money, opportunity cost, and political capital) on regulating. The social benefit that
they can expect to capture from the regulation will be less than the full social benefit
that the regulation produces. The externalized benefits affect the rational regulatory
constraint as follows, where e1 is the externalized social benefit of regulating:
SBr – e1 ≥ SCr
When this kind of externality occurs, each state acting alone systematically underproduces socially valuable regulation.
Furthermore, the social costs of regulating might also increase due to interstate
externalities. Imagine, for example, that Massachusetts imposes strict pollution
controls on its industrial manufacturers while New Hampshire chooses a laxer
regulatory environment. The regulated entities will move from Massachusetts to
New Hampshire in order to avoid the higher cost of complying with Massachusetts’s
pollution abatement laws, causing Massachusetts to suffer an additional social cost
of regulating: lost jobs and tax revenues. Massachusetts, then, has an incentive to
regulate only until:
SBr – e1 ≥ SCr + e2
or
SBr – e1 – e2 ≥ SCr
We can think of the e2 as a standard first-mover problem or multilateral prisoners’
dilemma, where each state wants to avoid being the first actor to impose pollution
abatement regulations because the first-acting state will lose business to later-acting
states.
To put the constraint in slightly different terms, a state’s willingness to pay for a
regulation should equal the total social benefit that the regulation will produce (WTP
= SBr). Externalities cause the state to experience something less than the full social
benefit, decreasing the state’s willingness to pay accordingly (WTP = SBr – e1 – e2 –

22
Throughout this Article, I will apply a rational actor model to regulatory decision-making. The
rationality I apply here, however, is the tautological kind of rationality. If a government chooses to
regulate, I assume that the benefits of the regulation outweigh the costs from the relevant
government’s perspective. Many lawmakers might include disfavored interests in the cost-benefit
calculus, such as the lawmakers’ personal pecuniary interests, and many lawmakers might suffer
cognitive distortions in their assessments of costs and benefits, such as hyperbolic discounting. Those
kinds of distortions undoubtedly are problematic insofar as they lead lawmakers to enact non-optimal
regulations. None of that, though, undercuts the point I make here, which is just that externalization of
costs and benefits to other governments is also a problem that likewise leads lawmakers to enact nonoptimal regulations. This point does not at all depend on the objective rationality of the lawmaker,
though it does depend on a tautological assumption that lawmakers will not enact a regulation that,
from their perspective, has higher costs than benefits.
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e3 . . . – en). Externalization therefore pushes states systematically towards
underproduction of regulation.23
To make this picture more concrete, imagine that the total social benefit
Massachusetts could produce through pollution abatement laws is 100 utils.24 In
other words, imagine that polluters in Massachusetts are producing 100 utils worth
of harm that could be reduced through regulatory intervention. Ideally, the people of
Massachusetts would be willing to spend up to 100 utils of their own regulatory
inputs to address the problem and reduce the harm. That is, Massachusetts should be
willing to pass any pollution abatement law that is likely to be effective and that has
a total social cost of 100 utils or less to enact and enforce.
Unfortunately, there are two externalization problems that will lead
Massachusetts, quite rationally, to set its willingness to pay at less than 100 utils.
First, some of the harm from pollution produced in Massachusetts occurs in other
states, such that Massachusetts cannot expect to capture the full 100-util benefit of
eliminating the pollution produced within its borders. Some of that benefit will
accrue in the states to which Massachusetts’s air and water travel. Imagine, then, that
the out-of-state portion of the pollution abatement law’s benefits—the e1 of this
scenario—is twenty-five utils. (In other words, imagine that twenty-five percent of
the pollution generated in Massachusetts travels to and harms other states, such that
twenty-five percent of the benefits from eliminating that pollution will accrue in
other states.) That externality reduces Massachusetts’s willingness to pay for
regulation from 100 to seventy-five. The state therefore has a less-than-optimal
incentive to produce pollution abatement laws.
Second, individuals’ and corporations’ freedom of travel among the states might
heighten Massachusetts’s social cost of enactment, particularly if its close neighbors
refuse to regulate polluters. Imagine, then, that the cost to Massachusetts in
industrial business lost to competing states—the e2 in this scenario—is ten utils.
That externality alone would reduce Massachusetts’s willingness to pay for a 100util reduction in pollution to ninety utils, or if combined with the imagined e1, it
would reduce the willingness to pay to sixty-five utils. The e2 therefore also
decreases Massachusetts’s incentive to produce pollution abatement laws, causing it
to fall below the social optimum.
In short, the externalization of regulatory costs and benefits from one state to the
next distorts the states’ incentives to regulate. In the case of pollution abatement and
in any other regime in which e1 and e2 both have positive value, each state is underincentivized to regulate relative to the social optimum.25
What about Congress’s incentives? Assuming that the costs associated with both
e1 and e2 are entirely internal to the United States, Congress’s willingness to pay for
the same pollution abatement in Massachusetts will be the full 100 utils. Congress
captures all of the benefits to every state in the union of reducing pollution that
23
It is possible that externalities can be positive from the regulating state’s perspective, in which
case externalization will push states to over-regulate rather than under-regulate. That is not the
relevant case for Obamacare, however, and I therefore will not address that case here.
24
I use the “util” (a hypothetical unit common in the economics literature to measure overall
utility) as the unit of measurement for lack of any other unit that can capture the many varied costs
and benefits of regulation, including those like happiness or sadness that are not subject to
monetization. The util also permits the fiction that we can measure utility interpersonally, which is a
fiction that I indulge for the stylized analysis here.
25
As I mentioned in note 23, supra, there are cases in which e 1 or e 2 is negative, causing the
states to over-regulate relative to optimum, but because that is not the relevant case for Obamacare
and the individual mandate, I do not address that phenomenon here.
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originates in Massachusetts, and congressional policy-making can avoid the firstmover problem by setting a policy for all states at one time. In other words,
assuming that all benefits and costs of regulating pollution in Massachusetts are
internal to the United States, national decision-making will not be distorted; e1 and
e2 will be zero, and the regulatory incentive will be optimal.
Of course, the assumption is false, at least with respect to pollution. In this
regime, both e1 and e2 have international as well as interstate implications, meaning
that Congress will suffer non-zero externalities just as Massachusetts would. With
respect to e1, some of the pollution produced in Massachusetts will travel to Canada,
and some of it will contribute to global environmental degradations like climate
change. With respect to e2, national pollution restrictions might cause some
manufacturers to set up shop overseas in less-restrictive developing nations like
China, increasing the social cost to the United States of regulating polluters today
relative to the cost that later-moving nations will experience from the same
regulations.
Nevertheless, both of the externalities will be less impactful on the central
government’s willingness to pay than on the state governments’ willingness to pay.
As for e1, the magnitude of the externality relative to the total social benefit will be
smaller. This point is quite easy to see in the hypothetical case: a higher percentage
of the pollution produced in Massachusetts will stay in the United States than will
stay in Massachusetts. If the e1 for Massachusetts is twenty-five utils, then the e1 for
Congress must be less than twenty-five utils because not all of the externalized harm
from Massachusetts’s pollution will reach Canada. Some of it will impact New
Hampshire and Maine on its way to Canada, and some of it will go south instead,
impacting Rhode Island and the states below. In the abstract, this point is
mathematically true for all regulatory regimes imaginable. Simply by virtue of its
size, the United States government must internalize a higher percentage of the harms
it produces than any state government. As a ratio of its total geographic area,
Massachusetts has more borderland than the United States, providing more
opportunities for harms to sneak out of the territory.26 That is, a harm produced in
the dead center of Massachusetts has to travel less distance to reach another state
than a harm produced in the dead center of the United States has to travel to reach
another nation, and a harm produced at any random point in Massachusetts has to
travel a smaller average distance to reach another state than a harm produced at any
random point in the United States has to travel, on average, to reach another nation.
It is therefore mathematically certain that a larger government will internalize a
higher percentage of the physical harms it produces than a smaller government,
regardless of how many governments exist globally.
With respect to e2, the point is equally easy to see within the constraints of the
hypothetical, and the same mathematical certainty applies in the abstract, at least
within the constraint of a finite global system (i.e., within the constraint that the land
available for drawing jurisdictions is not infinite and is zero-sum). First take the
hypothetical: if Massachusetts regulates in a way that its manufacturers dislike, the
26
It is always mathematically true that the ratio of perimeter to area for any shape decreases as
the shape grows. Perimeter grows linearly with size while area grows exponentially. For example, a
circle’s perimeter to area ratio is 2πr : πr2. As the radius of the circle (r) grows, 2πr increases linearly,
but πr2 increases exponentially. The ratio between the two therefore decreases. The same is true for a
square with a side of length x, for which the ratio of perimeter to area is 2x : x2 , and the same is true
for any complex geometric shape. The math is more complicated for shapes in fractal dimensions, like
coastlines, but the principle is the same.
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manufacturers are free to move to any other state in the country or to any other
country in the world.27 They have many opportunities to escape the costly regulation
when a smaller government acts. If Congress regulates in a way that the
manufacturers dislike, however, they have forty-nine fewer options available for
escape. The likelihood that they will leave the regulating jurisdiction therefore
decreases, reducing the impact of e2 on the regulatory calculus. This point holds true
across any global governmental system we can imagine: the larger the governmental
jurisdictions within a finite global system, the fewer governments there will be and
the smaller the e2 will be for any given government.
In the end, then, because Congress represents a larger constituency and a larger
land mass, its incentives to regulate will be less distorted than the states’ incentives
to regulate in every single regulatory regime. As a general matter, externalization is
less of a problem for Congress than it is for a state legislature.
2. The Ubiquity of Externalization
The problem with interstate externalization as a justification for congressional
control is that it occurs, to varying degrees, in every regulatory regime. Because the
citizenry is freely mobile, there is not a single regulatory question that does not
experience some externalization of costs or benefits. Take the example that Cooter
and Siegel give of a local question: the building and maintenance of an ordinary
public park.28 For the most part, the people who live close to a city park will be the
ones to enjoy it, and those people will have an incentive to keep the park in good
condition. But tourists from other states will also be able to access the park, and any
benefits they derive from it or harms they impose on it (by littering, for example)
will be impossible for the park’s home state to recoup through taxation. The e1 for
public parks, therefore, is non-zero; some of the benefits of the park accrue to other
states, and some of the costs of the park derive from other states. Each state, thus,
has an incomplete incentive to build and maintain public parks. In other words, each
state’s willingness to pay for such parks is less than would be optimal from an
interstate perspective. (Cooter and Siegel somewhat ironically use New York City’s
Central Park to start this discussion of their paper, which is of course unusual among
city parks for the number of out-of-state visitors it attracts.29 Even an ordinary public
park might get an occasional out-of-state visitor, though, who will gain benefits and
impose costs that the home state cannot recoup directly, imposing some e1 on the
state’s decisional calculus.)
Similarly, Cooter and Siegel argue that the Supreme Court’s decisions in United
States v. Lopez30 and United States v. Morrison31 are correct under their theory
because, they assert, neither gun possession near schools nor violence against
27
For the sake of simplicity, I assume here that the cost to the manufacturer of moving from
Massachusetts to New Hampshire is the same as the cost to the manufacturer of moving from
Massachusetts to China. That assumption is obviously inaccurate, both in terms of the practical costs
of moving and in terms of the political and social costs of outsourcing. The distinction, though, cuts in
favor of my point here that the e 2 will be less for national action than for state action; it will be much
more likely that a regulated entity will move from state to state (harming the first state to regulate)
than that a regulated entity will move from nation to nation (harming the first nation to regulate).
28
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 137-38 (distinguishing between large parks on mountaintops,
which are likely to attract visitors from all over the country and are therefore national parks, and small
city parks, which are likely to benefit primarily the citizens who live close by).
29
Id. at 137.
30
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
31
529 U.S. 598 (2000).

COST-BENEFIT FEDERALISM

297

women causes interstate coordination problems.32 In starting their discussion of
Lopez, Cooter and Siegel explicitly contend that “the absence of regulation of guns
near schools in one state would not undercut the effectiveness of regulations
prohibiting them in other states.”33 They base this argument, though, on a narrow
view of the purposes and effects of the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA),
focusing exclusively on the costs to the state of actually enforcing a prohibition of
gun possession near schools and broadening the question only so far as to encompass
regulation of gun markets.34 From that narrow perspective, Cooter and Siegel are
right that one state’s refusal to enact a GFSZA would have no impact on another
state’s ability to enforce such a prohibition at home. But that’s not the law’s only
purpose or effect.
Part of the government’s theory in Lopez was that gun violence in schools
decreases the quality of education, producing citizens who are less able to contribute
meaningfully to the national economy.35 Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true—even
outside the stylized arguments that the government needed to make for a Commerce
Clause defense in Lopez—that Congress passed the GFSZA in part to address the
disaffection of American youth that was resulting from the increasing presence of
guns, gangs, and violence in primary and secondary education.36 Imagine, then, that
every state except Texas (where I was born and raised) enacted a GFSZA. Assuming
that the government’s causal story in Lopez is right, the average Texan in this
scenario would be more disaffected and less educated than the average citizen of any
other state and might also tend more towards criminality than the average American.
But the Texans would not all stay in Texas. Many of them (like me) would move to
other states and would attempt to find work there, frustrating the other states’
attempts to bolster their economies and decrease their crime rates with the GFSZA.
The presence within the other states’ borders of poorly educated and disaffected
Texans would continue to impose some guns-in-schools-related costs on the other
states’ economies. Furthermore, Texas would not suffer the full cost of refusing to
reduce gun violence in its schools. Many individuals educated in other states would
move to Texas to work there, and many of the criminal youth that Texas produced
would wind up imprisoned in other states. The Texas economy, thus, would not be
as bad as one would predict from Texas’s lack of a GFSZA. Each state’s willingness
to pay for the regulation is therefore less than the social optimum because a
regulating state will not capture the full social benefit of producing better-educated
and happier citizens.
Congress, on the other hand, has an incentive that is closer to the optimum.
Congress’s incentive is less distorted than any state’s because there is less in- and
out-migration across countries than across states. Again, this point is mathematically
true of any large government because the average distance one needs to travel to
escape a large government is greater than the average distance one needs to travel to
escape a small government. Of course, Congress’s willingness to pay will not be
perfect because people can and do move internationally, but the point is that
Congress is structurally better suited to internalize costs and benefits than the states.
32

Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 163.
Id.
See id. at 163-64.
35
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
36
See generally LOUIS HARRIS, A SURVEY OF E XPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND APPREHENSIONS
ABOUT GUNS AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE IN AMERICA (1993) (using survey data to document an increase
in gun possession in schools).
33
34
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This same story plays out with respect to the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) that was at issue in Morrison.37 In that case, the government argued that
VAWA would reduce economic costs caused by the intimidation, abuse, and
marginalization of women—that the statute would help women to contribute
meaningfully to the economy.38 Imagine again that every state except Texas enacted
a VAWA, reducing the incidence of domestic violence within their borders and
producing better and more productive women as a result. As with the less-welleducated Texans in the GFSZA case, the less-productive Texan women in the
VAWA case would not all stay in Texas, and they would, upon moving, undercut the
other states’ attempts to improve their economies. Furthermore, some self-assured
and confident non-Texan women might move in to Texas, helping the state to avoid
the full economic cost of refusing to pass a VAWA.
Notably, these externalities are not the pure hedonic externalities that Cooter
and Siegel acknowledge.39 The problem is not that Louisianans might be saddened
by the domestic violence or educational deficiencies that their neighbors experience.
It is instead that Texas’s policy choices impose concrete costs on Louisiana’s
economy when insecure women and disaffected youth from Texas move into
Louisiana’s jurisdiction. And the likelihood of that externality’s occurrence distorts
both Texas’s and Louisiana’s willingness to pay for their own GFSZA and VAWA
regulations.
Ultimately, under a pure externalization theory of regulation, Congress will
always internalize more regulatory costs and benefits and will therefore always
regulate better than the states. The regulatory incentives of a larger government will
always be closer to the optimum than the regulatory incentives of a smaller
government.
3. Two Empirical Limits of Collective Action Federalism
There are two complexities that might arise in the simple model of
externalization, and both complexities might limit the centralizing push of collective
action federalism. First, the simple assertion that no government has an optimal
incentive to regulate does not prove that no government will regulate optimally.
Some externalities might be harmless. Second, each jurisdiction might internalize
other states’ externalities in a way that counterbalances its own externalization,
neutralizing any harmful externality. I will flesh out each of those possibilities in
turn, but I will then proceed in Part II.A.4 to explain why neither provides a
satisfying justification for Cooter and Siegel’s internalization principle as stated.
a. Harmless Externalities
Let’s return to the stylized hypothetical from Part II.A.1: externalized pollution
reduces Massachusetts’s willingness to pay for pollution abatement laws from the
optimum of 100 utils to a suboptimum of sixty-five utils. But what would happen if
Massachusetts could enact a fully effective regulation at a social cost to its residents
of only sixty-four utils? In that case, Massachusetts might well pass a pollution
abatement law that would eliminate all 100 utils of Massachusetts-produced
environmental harm, even though the state’s incentive to regulate was imperfect. In
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United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
See id. at 634-36.
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Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 154-55.
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other words, there is a distinction, which Cooter and Siegel don’t draw but could,
between a distortion in regulatory incentives and a distortion in regulatory outcomes.
Notably, the possibility that this story will play out—that a state with a distorted
incentive to regulate will nevertheless reach an optimal regulatory result—does not
depend solely on the magnitudes of the externalities, costs, or benefits. It also
depends on the ratio between costs and benefits. The closer that ratio is to one (the
closer the costs and benefits are to being equal), the more likely it is that an
externality will affect regulatory outcomes. Take the public parks example. The
magnitude of the externality for most public parks is likely to be extremely small.
The city park in downtown Billings, Montana, probably gets very few out-of-state
visitors each year. But that point alone doesn’t imply that the externality doesn’t
matter. If Montana needs to expend 100 utils in order to build and maintain a park
that produces 100 utils of total social benefit, then any externalization of any
magnitude will cause under-production of parks. The externalization will be
harmless only if its magnitude is less than the difference between costs and
benefits—if, for example, Montana needs to spend ninety utils to produce 100 utils
of benefit and the state externalizes less than ten utils.
Nevertheless, the possibility of a harmless externality provides one potential
limit for collective action federalism. There might be many regulatory regimes in
which the ratio of costs to benefits is usually less than one and in which the
externalities are not high enough to distort regulatory outcomes; in those regimes,
rational states will reach optimal results despite their suboptimal willingness to pay.
b. Counterbalancing Externalization
The second possible limit on collective action federalism rests in the possibility
that an equal or greater in-migration of benefits could counterbalance the outmigration of benefits. The easiest example of this point is the example of Central
Park, an ordinary city park (from a legal perspective) that attracts an extraordinary
number of out-of-state tourists. To keep things concrete with numbers, imagine that
Central Park provides 100 utils of total social benefit to the individuals who visit the
park each year; they play in the park, enjoy the green space, visit the zoo, etc.
Imagine that twenty percent of those visitors are tourists from other states,
decreasing New York’s internalized social benefit to eighty utils (e1 = 20). Let’s
further imagine that the out-of-state visitors impose costs of ten utils on the park in
the form of congestion, littering, rock and trail erosion, grass trampling, etc., and
that New York has no means of recouping those ten utils through taxation or user
fees extracted from the tourists (e2 = 10). New York’s willingness to pay for Central
Park, on this simple model, is seventy utils—less than the optimal 100 utils.
It is possible, however, that the tourists’ presence in Central Park provides
income to New York that is externalized to the tourists’ home states. For example,
imagine that the tourists transfer some of their utils to New York by buying hot dogs
from Central Park vendors, hotel rooms from nearby establishments, Frisbees from
abutting sporting goods stores, etc. All of that income to New York comes out of the
tourists’ home economies, and it provides some counterbalance to the externalities
that New York experiences. If that counterbalance totals exactly thirty utils, then
New York’s incentive to build and maintain Central Park becomes perfectly optimal
again. If it is more or less than thirty utils, then the optimality of New York’s
regulatory result depends on the constraint described in the prior subsection—the
possibility that the overall externality is harmless.
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4. The Legal Problem with Collective Action Federalism
I noted at the outset of Part II.A that the legitimacy of Cooter and Siegel’s
internalization principle depends critically on whether power should flow to the
smallest unit of government that internalizes all of the effects of its exercise or to the
smallest unit of government that internalizes most of those effects. The two
empirical limits described above might provide some content to the word “most” in
the second formulation, and that might be what Cooter and Siegel intended to argue.
But that principle is unsatisfying for two reasons.
First, from a legal and constitutional perspective, it would be nice if a theory of
federalism provided some generalizable principle for assigning authority among
governments. Under the models for collective action federalism, the permissibility of
congressional action depends on extremely difficult and extremely specific empirical
evaluations of the costs, benefits, and externalities of each and every regulatory
question (not just each regulatory regime).40 Under the externality theory, it is
impossible to say, for example, that the states generally should have authority over
education because the cost-benefit ratio for teaching evolution or Huckleberry Finn
will be different from the cost-benefit ratio for teaching arithmetic or Jane Eyre and
because the harmful externalities associated with ignorance of evolution will be
different from the harmful externalities associated with ignorance of basic math.
The second problem with Cooter and Siegel’s internalization principle is that it
provides no justification for defaulting to the smallest unit of government. The
models here argue for the opposite presumption of regulatory authority because
Congress is structurally better-suited than the states to internalize regulatory costs
and benefits and is therefore structurally better-suited to follow optimal regulatory
calculi.41 Internalization scales directly (rather than inversely) with a government’s
size. Why not, then, set a rule that we should assign regulatory power to the largest
unit of government that can access reliable information about the costs and benefits
of a regulatory question? Or a rule that we should assign regulatory power to the
largest unit of government that has a plausible claim to democratic legitimacy? Or to
the largest unit of government that currently exists? Any of those rules would do
better at combating collective action problems than Cooter and Siegel’s default to
smallness.
But, of course, the problem with a default assumption of congressional
authority—and more generally with an internalization principle for deciding
constitutional federalism questions—is that a focus on externalization misses
something important about the American federal system, something that Cooter and
Siegel acknowledge in passing without ever addressing directly: state power has its
own structural regulatory advantages.
B. LIBERTARIAN FEDERALISM
Unlike collective action federalism, libertarian federalism is not yet a welldeveloped theory in the legal literature. Rather, it is an assertion that the Eleventh
Circuit42 and others43 have made in passing while arguing against the individual
40

See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 135-44.
See supra Part II.A.1.
42
Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1284,
1291-92 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27,
2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012)
41

COST-BENEFIT FEDERALISM

301

mandate. The theory, in its limited form, simply contends that the purpose of the
American federal structure is to preserve individual liberty. But how does it do that?
Preservation of liberty comes from two structural features of federalism. First,
American federalism encumbers the law-making process by housing authority in
fifty competing sovereigns, systematically decreasing the number of intrusive laws
that can pass. Second, smaller units of government give individuals greater
opportunities to influence regulatory decisions and more opportunities to flee
regulatory outcomes that they dislike.
As should be apparent from that brief description, the theory of libertarian
federalism does not depend at all on substantive categories of liberty, like the
freedoms of speech, religion, contract, or bodily autonomy. The kind of liberty at
issue here is a generalized freedom from governmental restraint. The question for
Obamacare under this theory, then, is not whether the insurance mandate violates
individual rights in a way that ought to receive scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment,
but rather whether strongly felt individual objections to the mandate ought to
counsel in favor of state control.
The first step in making this argument is to examine whether and how the states
can address multi-state regulatory needs if they do not act through Congress. That
discussion highlights two features of pure state power that track the two structural
points above (the general barrier to regulation and the preservation of regional
power), which I will flesh out in greater detail. Next, I will explain why the
libertarian theory pushes monotonically towards diffusion of regulatory authority.
Like the collective action theory, the libertarian theory needs some kind of limiting
principle in order to be a theory of federalism.
1. Multi-State Coordination and Coasean Federalism
The first step in understanding libertarian federalism is to ask whether and how
the states can act in their collective interest if not through national congressional
regulation. As Cooter and Siegel point out, the externalities among the states would
make no difference to regulatory results if transaction costs among the state
governments were zero.44 Consider again the hypothetical above: if Massachusetts
externalizes twenty-five utils worth of pollution-related harms onto New Hampshire
and Rhode Island, then those states should be willing to pay Massachusetts twentyfive utils to implement pollution abatement laws. On the same rational-actor model
of regulation that applied to Massachusetts itself, New Hampshire and Rhode Island
should be willing to pay for pollution abatement in Massachusetts up to the point
that the benefits to New Hampshire and Rhode Island of such laws equal the costs.
Any state that suffers harm from an absence of regulation—whether that harm is
produced in and externalized from another state or not—should be willing to pay for
harm-reducing regulation up to the point that the cost of the regulation equals its
benefits. On the working assumption that Massachusetts externalizes twenty-five
utils of harm, the states that suffer from that externality should be willing to transfer
twenty-five utils to Massachusetts in exchange for full pollution abatement. A

(noting at the outset that the “ultimate goal” of “structural constitutional limitations” is “the protection
of individual liberty” and that the mandate’s perceived intrusion on freedom “strikes at the very heart
of whether Congress has acted within its enumerated power”).
43
See generally supra note 8 and sources cited therein.
44
See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 139-44. This point is simply an application of the Coase
theorem. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & E CON. 1 (1960).
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transfer (t1) equal to the externality (e1) would restore optimality in Massachusetts’s
willingness to pay:
If t1 = e1, then WTP = SBr – e1 + t1 = SBr.
Furthermore, states may constitutionally enter into these kinds of regulatory
compacts (without congressional oversight or approval) as long as the compacts do
not tend “to increase the political power in the States” in a way that “encroach[es]
upon or interfere[s] with the just supremacy of the United States.”45 Simple
regulatory compacts to pay for each other’s laws and law enforcement are
constitutionally permissible.46 In theory, then, a central government is entirely
unnecessary to address interstate externalities; assuming zero transaction costs,
states will bargain to the most efficient result.47
But, of course, transaction costs are not zero. It is difficult for states to enter into
regulatory compacts, particularly because individual states can hold out and render
compacts ineffective for any regulatory problem that requires universal participation
among the states. In discussing this holdout problem, Cooter and Siegel conclude
that requiring interstate cooperation through compacts effectively sets a unanimity
requirement for multi-state regulation,48 compared to the majority requirement that
theoretically applies when the states cooperate through Congress.49 In their view, a
regulatory problem that requires all fifty states to act is virtually impossible to
address through coordinated action because a unanimous vote in a fifty-member
body is extremely unlikely.50
Although Cooter and Siegel’s argument is fundamentally right, it contains a
simplification that causes the authors to miss something important about federalism:
they treat the states as monolithic voting units, rather than focusing on the people
who comprise them. In the eyes of a libertarian federalist, the relevant question is
whether a majority of individual voters favor a regulatory intervention. And
although the cooperation requirement is (as Cooter and Siegel note) a requirement
for state unanimity, it is not a requirement for popular unanimity.51 Imagine, then,
that a majority of American voters nationwide favor a regulatory intervention, and
assume for simplicity that all states make decisions through majority rule in which
representation works perfectly.52 Under these conditions, the success or failure of
regulation through compacts depends on the distribution of the national majority. If
that majority were comprised of mere majorities in every state, the compact system
would work. If, however, the national majority were comprised of supermajorities in
45

See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) (interpreting and applying the Compacts
Clause of the Constitution, U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 3).
46
See generally U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
47
See Coase, supra note 44.
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See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 140-41.
49
Congress, of course, is not really a majority voting system. The Senate’s filibuster rule
requires a sixty percent vote among states, and the Senate’s equal representation of states requires far
more than a sixty percent vote among the American populace. Nevertheless, the three-fifths voting
requirement in the Senate is an easier hurdle to overcome than the unanimous voting requirement for
compacts.
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See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 141.
51
Id. at 140-41.
52
Forty-nine state legislatures (all but Nebraska) have two chambers and therefore more closely
resemble supermajority rule. Unlike Congress, though, all state legislative districts abide by
proportional representation requirements; only the national Senate violates the one-person, one-vote
requirement. Furthermore, representation is imperfect, and it is certainly possible that a regulation
could fail despite majority or even supermajority popular support or that a regulation could pass
despite majority or even supermajority popular opposition.
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some states and minorities in others, compact-based regulation would work partially
or fail entirely; the states with only minority support for the regulation would refuse
to enter the compact.
How does that compare to Congress? Assuming majority rule and perfect
representation, Congress would be able to pass any regulation that had majority
support nationwide so long as the regulation had majority popular support in a mere
majority of states. The House of Representatives ensures that nationwide majority
support is required, but the Senate allows a mere majority of states to control
national regulatory outcomes. Imagine, then, that fifty-one percent of the population
in each of twenty-six states favored a regulatory intervention but that seventy-five
percent of the population in each of the remaining twenty-four states opposed the
regulation. Imagine further that the twenty-four objecting states were among the
least populous and that the regulation therefore had majority popular support in the
country as a whole. The House of Representatives would pass the regulation based
on majority support nationwide, and the Senate would pass the regulation based on
majority support in a majority of states. The fifty-two Senators from the twenty-six
supportive states would pass the law over the objections of the forty-eight Senators
from the twenty-four opposing states. Congress, thus, can pass an intervention over
the strong objections of a regional popular supermajority.
Cooter and Siegel are of course right that the probability of garnering majority
support in every voting unit decreases as the number of voting units increases.
Requiring majority popular support in every state undoubtedly makes regulations
harder to pass than requiring majority popular support in a majority of states. The
point here is just that the problem with compact-based regulation is not quite as bad
as Cooter and Siegel imply; it is theoretically possible for compacts to pass with
mere majority popular support nationwide. And as we shall see, the preservation of
state sovereignty, the requirement for state acquiescence in national regulation, and
the difficulties that come with a state-based unanimity requirement were all part of
the constitutional design, intended as checks against anti-libertarian incursions.
2. Collective Action Problems, Regional Differentiation, and Liberty
The possibility of national regulation through interstate compacts highlights two
features of state power that are desirable from a libertarian federalist’s perspective.
First, by giving power to fifty competing sovereigns that must cooperate to regulate,
federalism helps to ensure that implemented regulations are truly necessary and
preferred. Second, by requiring unanimity among the states for national regulation,
federalism empowers individual voters to influence the national regulatory process
through their state governments, either by voicing their opinions in their states or by
moving from a pro-regulatory state to an anti-regulatory state in order to increase the
power of an oppositional majority (or vice versa). Both of these features of
federalism empower individuals relative to governments, structurally preserving
freedom from unwanted regulatory intrusions.
a. Compacts, Information, and Tyranny
The first libertarian benefit of state power relates to informational problems in
regulation. It is of course true that Congress can regulate more quickly and
efficiently than the states. There is someone who can regulate more quickly and
efficiently than Congress, too: King George III. The benefit of diffusing regulatory
power is that it checks against governmental abuse and tyranny. Compact-based
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regulation is harder to enact than congressional regulation, but that difficulty is a
feature, not a bug, of the American federal system.
This view is based on two interrelated premises. First, regulators are selfinterested individuals who will, if able, use their power to favor themselves over the
general welfare (i.e., the assumption of perfect representation is deeply fictional).
Second, voters will have a hard time monitoring their representatives’ self-interested
tendencies.53 To put the first premise in the economic terms of the collective action
theory, the concern here is that a regulating class will be able to capture excessive
benefits for itself by externalizing the costs of those benefits onto the regulated
class.54 Notably, this kind of tyranny needn’t push systematically towards overregulation. A ruling class made up primarily of employers, for example, might refuse
to pass welfare-enhancing legislation that would protect collective bargaining rights
of employees, and that under-regulation would also be due to tyrannical
externalization rather than interstate externalization. The only mechanism for
combating that kind of externalization is the periodic election of the regulators by
the regulated, but that mechanism will fail if voters have incomplete information
about the magnitude and distribution of a legislative proposal’s costs and benefits.
In other words, if we had perfect information about the costs and benefits of a
particular regulatory question, the monitoring feature of state power would be
entirely unnecessary. Any governmental entity could identify the optimal regulatory
outcome, taking account of all relevant interests for all affected individuals, and
voters would know when a legislature (whether state or national) was refusing to
regulate optimally.55 Both regulatory outcomes and government’s accountability for
those outcomes would function well, and voters could trust Congress (or King
George) with its greater regulatory speed and efficiency.
But we do not have perfect information. The costs and benefits of regulations
are complex and obscure to both legislators and voters, providing slack in the
legislator-voter relationship that the ruling class can exploit for its own gain.
Furthermore, information is likely to be asymmetric with respect to many regulatory
questions, with regulators holding more information than voters, which allows
regulators to justify self-interested outcomes in terms that are not transparently selfserving.
The coordination problems among the states help to prevent these kinds of
abuses in three ways. First, requiring cooperation among competing sovereigns
reduces the likelihood of insidious collusion among the regulating class. Assuming
that Massachusetts and New Hampshire are competing for desirable residenttaxpayers,56 New Hampshire legislators will have an incentive to blow the whistle on
Massachusetts legislators if Massachusetts proposes a conspiratorial compact to
benefit the ruling class. In other words, the multi-lateral prisoners’ dilemma that
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See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, 34-44 (1991).
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See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3.
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It is for this reason that I have argued elsewhere for greater nationalization of healthcare
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Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L.
R EV. 2323 (2010).
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See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL. E CON. 416
(1956) (modeling interstate competition and theorizing that such competition could theoretically result
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results from the mobility of the citizenry57 works to the cops’ advantage in this case
just as it does in any standard prisoners’ dilemma. That is, just as coordination
problems among prisoners lead the prisoners to confess, providing more information
to the police, the coordination problems among the states will cause regulators in
one state to confess to other state’s tyrannical compact proposals, providing more
information to voters (the metaphorical cops in this story). In Congress, by contrast,
the members are not in direct competition with one another and are therefore less
likely to reveal each other’s collusive proposals.58
Second, each representative is structurally more accountable when government
is smaller, making monitoring easier. This is so for three reasons. First, each voter
has a greater individual stake in regulatory outcomes when government is regulating
fewer people, and each individual voter therefore has a stronger incentive to monitor
representatives when government is smaller. That is, the free-rider problem in voting
systems and accountability structures is less severe for smaller governments than for
bigger ones. Second, each voter has greater access to her representative when the
representative has fewer constituents. Direct conversations with the representative
are significantly more likely to occur for smaller governments than for bigger ones,
making it easier to challenge a representative on a questionable regulatory decision
when government is smaller. Third, the costs and benefits of regulation are easier to
assess when government is smaller, reducing the information asymmetry between
regulators and voters. I can be more confident in my sense of majority needs and
preferences in my law school community than in my university community, in my
university than in my city, in my city than in my state, etc., because I am closer to
my fellow constituents in smaller governments than in larger ones. If my law school
enacts a welfare-reducing rule, I will be more likely to notice and object than if my
university does so, or my city, state, or nation.59
Third, simply by increasing the difficulty of regulating, state power makes it
less likely that any regulation will pass, which necessarily makes it less likely that
tyrannical or factional regulation will pass. There are two important points about this
idea. First, the argument is not that suboptimal regulation is good (a view commonly
attributed to libertarians); it is that the costs of suboptimal regulation might be a
reasonable price to pay to avoid tyrannical regulation.60 This point takes an explicitly
57
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rule-utilitarian view of governmental structure. The idea is that no governmental
system, under our real-world conditions of limited and asymmetric information, will
produce optimal regulation, and we therefore need to choose between imperfect
options. The option of decentralized and competitive power among states will result
in under-regulation, but the option of centralized and monopolistic power in
Congress will result in abusive regulation. To avoid the costs of tyranny, we pay in
stagnation.61 Second, the argument is not that collective regulation should never
happen but rather that it should happen only when the vast majority of people
nationwide believe that it should happen. In discussing the problem of public goods
provision, Cooter and Siegel note that interstate externalities and free-rider problems
justify central provision of national defense.62 But, of course, the states fought and
won the American Revolution without such centralized constitutional authority—
through a loose contractual affiliation in the Continental Congresses and relying
primarily on separately governed state militias.63 When coordinated action is truly
necessary, the states can and will cooperate. Furthermore, the converse is true: when
the states enter into compacts for national regulation, voters can be confident,
despite their informational deficits and asymmetries, that the regulation is truly
necessary.
In short, under the theory of libertarian federalism, the difficulties of regulating
that come with state control are to be celebrated, not combated. The reason for this
view, though, is not that markets are better than governments at regulating—the
view of standard libertarianism. For a libertarian federalist, the reason to celebrate
state power is that small, competitive governments are structurally better than big,
monopolistic governments at protecting against regulatory abuses.
b. Regional Majorities, Voice, and Exit
The other libertarian virtue that comes with state power similarly arises from the
requirement that majorities in every state, not just in a majority or even
supermajority of states, agree to a national regulation. This feature of state power
creates the possibility that a national minority can satisfy its regulatory preferences
by establishing a state majority, better preserving every citizen’s freedom to escape
unwanted regulatory interventions. Three structural features of state power are
necessary for this possibility to occur: State control allows citizens of different states
to diversify in their regulatory approaches (diversity). It allows each citizen to lobby
more effectively for change (voice). And it allows citizens to move from one
regulatory jurisdiction to another (exit). In this sense, the mobility of the citizenry
(although it causes regulatory externalities) and the unanimity requirement of state
61

This point, too, appears in the Anti-Federalist papers:
[F]or the sake of argument, I will admit that the necessary consequence of rejecting or
delaying the establishment of the new constitution would be the dissolution of the union,
and the institution of even rival and inimical republics; yet ought such an apprehension,
if well founded, to drive us into the fangs of despotism? Infinitely preferable would be
the occasional wars to such an event. The former, although a severe scourge, is transient
in its continuance, and in its operation partial, but a small proportion of the community
are exposed to its greatest horrors, and yet fewer experience its greatest evils; the latter
is permanent and universal misery, without remission or exemption. As passing clouds
obscure for a time the splendor of the sun, so do wars interrupt the welfare of mankind;
but despotism is a settled gloom that totally extinguishes happiness.
Centinel, Union: Centinel, No. 11, in 1 THE C OMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALISTS, supra note 59, at 231.
62
See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 3, at 136.
63
See THE AMERICAN C ONSTITUTION : FOR AND AGAINST 3-6 (J.R. Pole ed., 1987) (describing
the coordinating efforts that the colonies made to fight the Revolutionary War).
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power (although it causes stagnation) are both features rather than bugs of the
federal system.
First, one of the primary advantages of state control is that it allows for regional
diversity. Of course, such diversity is undesirable if there is an identifiable first-best
regulatory approach that applies in all jurisdictions. But even if voters had perfect
information about a regulation’s costs and benefits, optimality might vary
geographically. The cost of requiring clean coal, for example, is greater in the East
than it is in the West, while the cost of requiring coal scrubbing is greater in the
West than it is in the East.64 When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
faced the difficult challenge of setting a single emissions-reduction regulation for the
entire country despite differing regional cost-benefit curves, it necessarily regulated
non-optimally for one of the affected regions.65 It might have chosen the optimal
outcome under a constraint of monolithic national policy-making, but it certainly
chose a non-optimal outcome for some regions. If the states had been in charge
instead, it would have been possible for different states with different cost-benefit
curves to implement different regulations, and the end result might have better
approximated national optimality than the EPA’s monolithic approach,
notwithstanding the interstate externalities associated with coal-burning power
plants. Similarly, if voters in Texas have different preferences than voters in
Massachusetts with respect to the level of governmental involvement in their
healthcare decisions, it might make sense to let Texas citizens regulate healthcare
differently than Massachusetts citizens, even though (like coal pollution) healthcare
regulation suffers from interstate externalities.
Second, for the same reasons that individuals will have an easier time
monitoring representatives when governments are smaller, they will have an easier
time affecting regulatory decisions when governments are smaller. If each
representative has fewer constituents, then each constituent has a greater incentive
and a greater ability to communicate her preferences to her representative. The
probability that a representative will hear her constituent’s voice and respond to it
increases as the size of the representative’s constituency decreases. It is therefore
plausible that a bare state majority that seeks state regulation is more likely to
succeed than a bare national majority that seeks national regulation, even assuming
that the state and national governments have identical majority voting rules.
Representation works better at the state level.
Third, state power provides greater opportunities than national power for
individuals to leave a disfavored regulatory regime for a preferred one. Of course,
international mobility is possible, but interstate mobility is easier. This feature of
state power similarly allows individuals to influence the regulations to which they
are subject simply by moving to the state that has the most attractive bundle of
regulations.
In short, state power provides structural freedom to individuals that
monopolistic, monolithic national power cannot provide. State control gives citizens
more and cheaper opportunities to choose the kinds of governmental restraints they
will tolerate.

64
See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the
Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466 (1980) (describing the odd dirty coal/clean air coalition that formed
during implementation of the Clean Air Amendments in a 1979 ruling by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)).
65
See id. at 1483-87 (describing the EPA’s decision-making process).
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3. The Monotonically Decentralizing Push of Libertarian Federalism
Just as collective action federalism pushes monotonically towards centralization
of power, libertarian federalism pushes monotonically towards diffusion of power.
Smaller, competitive governments will always be better at checking tyranny and at
facilitating diversity, voice, and exit. For every regulatory regime, smaller
governments will be structurally better-suited than bigger governments to protect
individual liberty. Even for classic public goods like national defense, smaller
governments can accomplish any needed regulation through treaties and compacts,
just as the American colonies did to fight the Revolution and just as today’s Western
nations do through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The problem with the theory, then, is that without a limiting principle,
libertarian federalism argues for the dissolution of the national government. The
United States should, if libertarian federalism is taken to its natural conclusion,
disband into fifty nations and negotiate their collective interests through compacts.
From a legal and constitutional perspective, then, libertarian federalism does not
provide a workable test. The constitutional answer cannot be that the enumeration of
national powers is meaningless and that the United States should disband—nor
should the constitutional answer be that the enumeration should be read as narrowly
as the words will allow. Such a reading would not do justice to the Framers’ intent
or to the document’s modern meaning.
C. COST-BENEFIT FEDERALISM
Given that both collective action federalism and libertarian federalism rest on
foundationally correct visions of government but that each theory taken alone would
argue for the end of federalism, we need some way to reconcile the two. Fortunately,
there is an easy theoretical answer. The best federalist balance is the one that
optimizes the benefits of regulatory efficiency within the constraint of libertarian
costs (or, the same rule, that optimizes the benefits of individual liberty within the
constraint of efficiency costs). Indeed, the same cost-benefit constraint that applies
to each government’s regulatory decision should apply to the structural
constitutional decision. We should be willing to centralize authority up to the point
that the costs of centralization equal the benefits, where the costs are measured in
terms of the liberty lost and the benefits in terms of the efficiency gained.
Centralization should be allowed whenever:
SBc ≥ SCc
The question, then, ought to be whether a proposed national regulation will gain
enough in correction of interstate externalities to be worth the losses to structural
libertarian virtues.
This rule has three advantages over the two competing theories. First, it
incorporates all of the foundational correctness of the other two views. Second, it is
truly a theory of federalism rather than a theory of either nationalism or statism; it
captures the advantages of both state and national governance, as the American
federal structure is intended to do. Third and most interestingly, it provides a
generalized guideline for which regulatory regimes ought to be nationalized and
which ought to be left to states. Put most obviously, the guideline is that regimes in
which liberty is more important than efficiency should be left to states while regimes
in which efficiency is more important than liberty ought to be given to Congress. A
more nuanced way to put the same point is that regimes in which the costs and
benefits are primarily subjective and preference-based ought to be left to states while
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regimes in which the costs and benefits are primarily objective and needs-based
ought to be given to Congress. Yet another verbal formulation is that regulations
whose primary benefit is their expression and facilitation of voters’ preferences
should be left to the states while regulations whose primary benefit is their realworld effects should be given to Congress. This is so for two simple reasons: First,
subjective harms have a harder time traveling across state lines than objective harms,
and the harms that do travel are unlikely to change subjectively based regulatory
decisions (i.e., externalities are quite likely to be harmless). Second, in the American
constitutional system, liberty is generally more important in subjective regimes than
in objective regimes.
Take the point about externalities first: where regulatory optimality depends
primarily on voters’ subjective preferences rather than their objective needs,
interstate externalities are very unlikely to impact regulatory decision-making. For
example, the subjective preference for protecting traditional marriage in Maine will
cause externalities for Vermont, but those externalities are very unlikely to impact
Vermont’s decision to protect gay marriage. That is, because of its marriage
protection law, Maine might produce homophobic straight citizens who will carry
their homophobia with them when they travel to Vermont, and it might produce
traumatized gay citizens who will carry their psychological ill-health with them
when they travel to Vermont.66 Both of those externalities will distort Vermont’s
regulatory cost-benefit curve. Vermont will not capture the full benefit of allowing
gay marriage because some homophobia and trauma will continue to leak in from
other states. But because the primary benefit that Vermonters seek when allowing
gay marriage is simply the effectuation of their subjective preference for marriage
equality, they are very unlikely to change their regulatory outcome in response to
imported harms from Maine.67 Furthermore, although Vermonters may feel that
Maine’s marriage protection statute decreases their enjoyment of marriage equality
in Vermont, that harm is also extremely unlikely to impact their regulatory decision.
This picture contrasts sharply with the picture of objective, outcomes-based
regulation, where the importation of harms changes the level of success that a
regulation can achieve and therefore undermines the state’s entire reason for
regulating. That is, in the pollution case, if New Hampshire cannot reduce
environmental harms associated with manufacturing due to externalities from
Massachusetts, then it might not regulate at all. Other than the reduction of those
costs, New Hampshire has little if any reason to stop its industries from polluting.
Second, consider liberty: structural liberty is generally more important for
subjective regulations than for objective ones. Most obviously, voice matters more
in subjective regulatory regimes because the optimality of a regulatory outcome in
those regimes depends on whether it represents most citizens’ preferences.
Regulators will have better knowledge of those preferences if they represent fewer
voters. It is also likely that the harm of tyranny and the benefit of diversity are
greater for subjective regulations. The American constitutional system protects
freedom of conscience well above freedom of contract. Citizens’ ability to choose a
regulatory regime that best captures their subjective preferences might therefore be
66
See generally Maria Godoy, State By State: The Legal Battle Over Gay Marriage, NPR (Feb.
7, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2009/12/15/112448663/state-by-state-the-legal-battle-over-gay-marriage
(showing that Maine has a marriage protection statute while Vermont allows gay marriage).
67
This portrayal is one-sided only for the sake of simplicity. The story works just as well if we
imagine harms arising in a marriage equality state flowing into a traditional marriage state. The
traditional marriage state is unlikely to change its regulatory result in response to those harms.
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constitutionally more important than their ability to choose a regulatory regime that
best meets their objective needs. For example, compare a homophobic citizen who
moves from Vermont to Maine to take advantage of Maine’s marriage protection
statute to a negligent doctor who moves from Nevada to California to take advantage
of California’s cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.68 Both
have taken advantage of libertarian federalism, but one has done so to satisfy
subjective preference while the other has done so to satisfy objective need.
Regardless of one’s prior views of gay marriage or medical malpractice awards,
American lawyers might tend to think more kindly of the homophobe than the quack
simply because the Constitution protects homophobia but not quackery.69 (Note that
homophobia does not get substantive due process protection. The idea here is a
general one of freedom of conscience—a First Amendment right if anything—rather
than a specific substantive right under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.)
Monitoring is the one structural libertarian advantage of state control that does
not seem to vary based on the subjectivity or objectivity of a regulatory question. It
is equally easy for a regulating class to externalize costs onto a regulated class
through subjective regulation as through objective regulation, and reliable
information about subjective costs is equally hard to gather as reliable information
about objective costs. If anything, it might be slightly easier to figure out the voting
majority’s preferences than its needs because reliable polling might be slightly
cheaper than reliable empirical studies.
There are two important points to make about this distinction before moving on.
First, the distinction between subjective and objective regulation roughly tracks—
but is more nuanced than—the Supreme Court’s distinction between economic and
noneconomic regulation. Most economic regulation is objective and outcomeoriented while most noneconomic regulation is subjective and expression-oriented.
That said, the overlap is imperfect. The Gun-Free School Zones Act, for example,
strikes me as an objective and outcomes-based rather than subjective and preferencebased statute, even though the Supreme Court in Lopez certainly was right that it is
primarily noneconomic.70 Congress’s goal with the GFSZA probably was not to
satisfy a subjective preference for excluding guns from schools; the members
seemed earnestly interested in combating bad outcomes from school shootings and
school violence. In other words, if confronted with objective proof that the presence
of guns in schools has no bad effects for education or criminality, the members
probably would have changed their minds. As a result, the externalities described in
Part II.A.2 might have a real impact on states’ willingness to enact GFSZA statutes,
and collective action problems might be a serious hindrance to state-based
regulation.71 (In Morrison, by contrast, it seems likely that the motivation for the

68
See generally Peter P. Budetti & Teresa M. Waters, Medical Malpractice Laws in the United
States, KAISER FAM . FOUND ., 22 (2005), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/Medical-MalpracticeLaw-in-the-United-States-Report.pdf (indicating that the average damage award in Nevada is
significantly higher than in California); Ethan M.J. Lieber, Medical Malpractice Reform and the
Distribution of Physicians (Univ. of Chi. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper, 2012),
http://home.uchicago.edu/~elieber/advselpaper.pdf (finding that negligent doctors are more likely than
non-negligent doctors to move in response to changing medical malpractice laws).
69
For a similar argument, see Hills, supra note 10, and Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as
Westphalian Liberalism, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 769 (2006)
70
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
71
Notably, Congress responded to Lopez in 1996, less than a year after the Court’s opinion, by
simply adding a jurisdictional element to the statute, such that it applies only to guns that have
traveled in interstate commerce (which is the vast majority of them). See Pub. L. No. 104-208, Title
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Violence Against Women Act was just the view that domestic violence is wrong.
VAWA’s supporters probably would not change their minds if confronted with
evidence that battered women are equally productive in society—or even if
confronted with evidence that they are more so.)
The second point about the subjective-objective distinction is that it is merely a
generality that emerges from the cost-benefit theory; it is not the theory’s ultimate
meaning or content. There might, therefore, be examples of subjective regulations
that should be assigned to the national government—if the liberty costs of national
regulation are demonstrably smaller than the efficiency costs of state regulation—
and there might also be examples of objective regulations that should be assigned to
the state governments. Nevertheless, cost-benefit federalism provides a better
general picture than collective action federalism of when national regulation ought
to be allowed.
III. POLITICAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Writing in 1954, Herbert Wechsler famously argued that the states could protect
their sovereign status through their structural role in selecting national leaders and in
passing national statutes.72 The political safeguards of federalism, Wechsler argued,
counseled against any judicial role in reviewing federalism challenges and
invalidating national laws.73 Of course, Wechsler’s view has not carried the day;
since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has increased its role in federalism
enforcement.74 Nevertheless, the political safeguards of federalism frequently impact
national legislation in ways that are important to the cost-benefit theory.
Furthermore, the cost-benefit theory aligns with Wechsler’s instinct and with
modern doctrinal practice insofar as it argues for a high degree of judicial deference
to national legislative outcomes (though perhaps slightly less judicial deference to
states’ legislative outcomes).75
This Part considers the modern picture of political federalism and the limits of
judicial enforcement under the cost-benefit theory. Both the states’ political power
and the courts’ political isolation complicate the theory, at least in its application to
constitutional challenges. This Part notes, first, that states often win the right to
preserve liberty within national regulatory regimes and that national regulation often
successfully balances efficiency and liberty within single statutory structures.
Second, this Part concedes that the optimal balance between efficiency and liberty
will be difficult if not impossible to assess, for courts and legislatures alike, and it
argues on that basis that federalism enforcement should be left primarily to the more
democratically legitimate branch: the legislature. That said, because the national
government can preserve state advantages more easily than the states can capture
national advantages, the judiciary might be justified in enforcing state-limiting rules,
like the Dormant Commerce Clause, more strictly than nation-limiting rules.
VI, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-369 to 3009-370 (1996). The statute has thus been in nearly
continuous effect since its first enactment in 1990, notwithstanding its invalidation in Lopez.
72
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 C OLUM . L. R EV. 543 (1954).
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See id.
74
See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the
New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 M ICH. L. R EV. 615, 618-26 (1995) (tracing the
origins of “the new federalism”—the Court’s renewed assertions of authority to enforce federalism
norms—from the 1970s through the Lopez decision).
75
See generally Wechsler, supra note 72.
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A. POLITICAL FEDERALISM
For the sake of simplicity, the discussion in Part II assumed that regulation must
be either wholly state or wholly national. But, of course, many regulatory regimes
are both. Through their constitutional power in the selection of Senators and
Presidents and through their lobbying power in the National Conference of State
Legislatures and National Governors Association, for example, the states frequently
win concessions in national statutes and national regulations, allowing them a
continuing role in regulatory regimes that Congress partially assumes.76 National
statutes preserve the states’ role in two ways: First, some national statutes are
narrowly preemptive or non-preemptive, allowing Congress to fix externalities and
collective action problems without affecting the states’ internal regulatory
decisions.77 Second, many national regulatory regimes take the form of “cooperative
federalism,”78 by which the national government sets a regulatory floor and provides
national funding but relies on the state governments to implement a program that is
at least as comprehensive as the national floor.
Consider first non-preemptive national law that solves externalities. Gay
marriage provides an easy though controversial example of this kind of national
legislation. Although marriage, including gay marriage, is primarily a state issue
under modern law, the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)79 limits the
possible externalities that might arise as states begin to permit gay marriage. That is,
DOMA does not preempt or otherwise interfere with states’ marriage licensure
regimes or their own marriage benefits rules, but it does ensure that “traditional
marriage” states must neither recognize gay marriages performed in other states nor
fund national marriage benefits for gay couples.80 DOMA, thus, is an example of a
non-preemptive national regulation that exists solely for the purpose of alleviating
collective action problems among the states, making it easier for some states to
allow gay marriage without imposing costs on others and making it easier for the
other states to capture the full costs and benefits of prohibiting gay marriages within
their borders. The national statute thus facilitates rather than threatening libertarian
federalism.81
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See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J
2023 (2008). For a discussion of states’ roles in selecting senators and presidents, see Wechsler, supra
note 72.
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For the proposition that preemption is worse for states and federalism than commandeering,
see generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256 (2009).
78
See generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. R EV. 663 (2001); Hills, supra note 11.
79
See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). Several federal court cases are currently considering the substantive and
structural constitutionality of DOMA. See, e.g., Hara v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 09-3134 (Fed. Cir.
May 18, 2009); Torres-Barragan v. Holder, No. 10-55768 (9th Cir. May 14, 2010); Gill v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010); Bishop v. United States, No. 04-848 (N.D. Okla.);
Dragovich v. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 10-1564, 2012 WL 253325 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012).
President Obama has decided not to defend the statute in court. See David G. Savage & James
Oliphant, Obama Administration Shifts Legal Stance on Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/23/nation/la-na-obama-gay-marriage-20110224/2.
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See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419.
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I realize that this may be a controversial—and is certainly an atypical—view of DOMA, but its
limiting effect on externalities is certainly one of its effects.
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Furthermore, even when national law includes substantive regulations that might
cause doctrinal preemption when conflicts arise between state and national rules,82
those statutes can preserve a continuing state role that serves the purposes of
libertarian federalism. That is, Congress frequently passes legislation that empowers
national regulators to intervene when collective action problems arise but
nevertheless allows state governments to continue regulating alongside the national
government. The courts will read federal statutes narrowly, presuming that they are
minimally preemptive, as long as the statutes do not include explicit preemption
provisions and do not clearly intend to govern an entire regulatory field. This narrow
preemption approach is common in the criminal law, for example, where the
national government has authority to prosecute crimes that cross state lines, but the
states also have authority to prosecute the same crimes, whether or not the crimes
cross state lines. This structure allows the national government to pursue criminal
law enforcement when no state has a complete incentive to do so—when the costs of
criminality are distributed across several states. It also allows the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to take over when multiple
states want to prosecute a single instance of crime—a single murder, for example—
and cannot overcome their collective action problems. But this structure also allows
the states a continuing role in defining criminal behavior and enforcing criminal
prohibitions, providing some structural libertarian protection within a regime that is
sufficiently nationalized to fix externalities.
Indeed, a story of the complex interplay between efficiency and liberty in nonpreemptive regulatory regimes has played out recently in the case of marijuana
prohibitions. National law criminalizes possession and distribution of marijuana, and
the national government holds settled constitutional authority to punish intrastate
instances of those crimes.83 But state law also criminalizes possession and
distribution of marijuana, and states may enforce their own prohibitions without
running afoul of the Supremacy Clause.84 That is, the national ban is not fully
preemptive of state laws, and the states therefore have a continuing role in defining
drug offenses.
When several states started revising their prohibitions to allow marijuana
possession and distribution for medical purposes,85 that action put pressure on the
national government to ease its enforcement efforts with respect to possession and
distribution that complied with state law. Although it took a long time after the first
such permissive statute passed before the national government responded, President
Obama eventually announced that his administration would not enforce the federal
drug statute against medical marijuana dispensaries that complied with state and
local regulations.86 Even in the face of national regulation, then, the states were able
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See generally Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislation Preemption, 53 WM . & M ARY L. R EV. 163, 17580 (2011) (describing doctrinal preemption rules and generally theorizing Congress’s power to set its
own rules for preemption).
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See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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Preemption rules generally flow from the Supremacy Clause. See Altria Grp. v. Good, 555
U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
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See, e.g., Compassionate Use Act of 1996, C AL. HEALTH & SAFETY C ODE § 11362.5 (West
1996); Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, OR. R EV . STAT . ANN . § 475.300 (West 1998); see also 16
Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, PROC ON. ORG (Feb. 8,
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to serve their libertarian function of representing local majority preferences and
regulating competitively to capture diverse regional optimalities.
In October 2011, however, DOJ announced an enforcement effort in
California—one of the sixteen states with a permissive medical marijuana statute at
the time (and the first to pass such a law).87 The problem was that the state seemed
to be under-enforcing its own regulations against for-profit marijuana traffickers,
many of which, DOJ asserted, were operating interstate.88 Surprising her promedical-marijuana constituency, the state attorney general largely acquiesced in the
crackdown, but she urged DOJ to limit its efforts to trafficking organizations and to
respect the state’s legitimate medical marijuana industry.89 The complex interplay
between state and federal regulation, then, has roughly tracked the cost-benefit
theory, where the libertarian pressure for medical marijuana urged the national
government to minimize its role in the regime, but the inefficiencies in state
regulation of an interstate market compelled the national government to reassert
itself—at least somewhat.
More common than non-preemptive or narrowly preemptive national statutes,
however, are national regulations that rely on state administration—“cooperative
federalism” programs.90 Cooperative federalism self-consciously preserves the
states’ structural advantages, at least in part. Because cooperative federalism has
received significant scholarly attention as a strategy for effecting a federalist
balance,91 I will spend less time discussing its application to cost-benefit federalism
than I did for preemption. But just to concretize the point here, let’s consider the
Medicaid example and how it works for cost-benefit federalism. The Medicaid
statute provides national funding and guidelines for public health insurance
programs, but the programs themselves are structured and administered by the
states.92 The states thus have a crucial role in defining Medicaid entitlements, which
helps to preserve the state advantages of competition, diversity, voice, and exit in the
regime of public insurance for the poor. Meanwhile, though, national taxpayers fund
a portion of each state’s Medicaid program to offset externalities from mobile
Medicaid beneficiaries (externalities that would result in a classic race to the bottom
in the absence of national offsets93). The national government also sets guidelines for
qualifying Medicaid programs, setting a federal floor for the program to ensure that
states do not misuse the national funding or engage in a race to the bottom with
national complicity. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) enforces
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that floor by reviewing state plans before they go into effect.94 The Medicaid
program thus strikes a balance between state and national power that roughly tracks
the relative advantages of the two levels of government. The states are responsible
for the design and daily administration of the program so that they can be responsive
to local needs and preferences, and the national government attempts to cure
interstate externalities through financial transfers, regulatory floor-setting, and
administrative oversight.95
In short, the states’ political power frequently works to limit the scope of
national statutes. Many such statutes preserve significant opportunities for state
regulation. More importantly, the states’ role under these narrow and cooperative
statutes works to preserve the advantages of libertarian federalism.96 Even in
regimes like marijuana regulation, where a sweeping national statute with
unambiguous constitutional backing seems to present an insuperable barrier, states
can assert their interests and create opportunities for structural libertarianism.
Importantly, the political balance of power occurs far less frequently in reverse.
Although they are capable of doing so, the states rarely enter into regulatory
compacts in order to capture the efficiency advantages of national regulation. One
could imagine, for example, that Medicaid could work through a series of regional
compacts that would cover the insurance needs of regional rather than state or
national populations, or that California could enter into a compact with its neighbors
to prevent trafficking in recreational marijuana. But that kind of cooperative statebased regulation rarely happens.
In the end, then, when courts are reviewing national statutes for constitutional
validity, the statutes’ preservation of political opportunities for libertarian federalism
should be relevant to the analysis. When courts are reviewing state statutes for
constitutional validity under the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, the
possibility for coordination among states should be less relevant. National action is
much more likely to preserve the advantages of libertarian federalism than state
action is to capture the advantages of collective action federalism.
B. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
The second complicating factor for cost-benefit federalism is the difficulty of
ascertaining optimality. This problem is not at all unique to cost-benefit
federalism—it is pervasive in regulatory and constitutional decision-making.97 But
the problem raises an institutional competence issue for the cost-benefit theory. If
the test for constitutional federalism depends on assessing the optimal balance
between liberty and efficiency, how can courts apply that test given their imperfect
information about regulatory and structural costs and benefits?
94
See Review of State Plan Material, 42 C.F.R. § 430.14 (2012) (designating regional staff to
review state Medicaid plans and amendments).
95
Medicaid has not been the most successful cooperative federalism program. See generally
Moncrieff, supra note 55. Other such programs, particularly in telecommunications and environmental
law, have done better. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and
Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND . L. R EV. 1 (1999); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism
Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85
DENV. U. L. R EV. 791 (2008).
96
See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 77; Metzger, supra note 76.
97
Cass R. Sunstein, Humanizing Cost Benefit Analysis, Remarks Prepared for American University’s Washington College of Law Administrative Law Review Conference (Feb. 17, 2010), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_speech_02172010 (describing the use of cost-benefit analysis
by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which oversees all federal regulations).
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My answer—theoretically unsatisfying though it may be—is that the judiciary
should review for extreme violations of cost-benefit federalism but should largely
defer to Congress. The barrier that prevents first-best application of cost-benefit
federalism is an informational barrier—the inability of any governmental body to
discern the need for structural libertarianism, to assess the risk of tyranny, to
calculate the magnitude of externalities, to ascertain the optimal level of regulatory
intervention, etc. In short, the libertarian costs of nationalization and the efficiency
costs of diffusion are simply impossible to estimate. In considering the proper scope
of judicial review, then, the question is not whether or how the courts can figure out
cost-benefit optimality. They can’t. The question, instead, is whether Congress or
the courts will generally do better at figuring out that optimality. Based on their
relative structural competencies, the obvious answer is that Congress will generally
do better than the Court.
First, simply by virtue of comprising a representative body subject to regular
elections, members of Congress have a stronger structural incentive than Supreme
Court Justices to understand constituents’ needs and preferences. Members have
strong electoral incentives to gather information about the true costs and benefits of
a regulatory question while the politically insulated judiciary has little incentive to
engage in more than a superficial or academic assessment of those costs and
benefits.
Second, congressional decision-making has procedural advantages for
information gathering. When the Supreme Court considers a case, only a limited
population of interested entities will have access to the proceedings, and many of
them will have access only through the imperfect mechanism of 9000-word amicus
briefs.98 When Congress regulates, however, there are no rules limiting interested
parties’ access to the decision-makers, except prohibitions on bribery.99 Unlike
courts and other adjudicative bodies, legislatures are actively encouraged to engage
in ex parte communications, gathering as much information as possible about the
overall regulatory picture they are confronting.
Finally, Congress is responsively federalist in a way that the Supreme Court is
not. Because the states have equal representation in the Senate and because the
Senate’s composition changes partially every two years and fully every six,
Congress’s structural incorporation of federalist information is regularly updated.
Congress therefore responds structurally to changing needs and preferences if new
regional majorities form and want libertarian protection through diffusion of
authority or if interstate externalities emerge and require collective action through
centralization of authority. Either of those emerging needs will cause the Senate’s
composition to change (or its members’ opinions to change), assuming that voters in
the affected states behave rationally. The Supreme Court, by contrast, is far less
responsive. The Justices are appointed with advice and consent of the Senate—not
the House—and therefore reflect federalism somewhat at the time of their
appointment. But because they hold life tenure unless impeached, the Supreme
Court’s structural federalism will be much slower to catch up to changing needs and
preferences in the states.
In short, Congress’s greater democratic legitimacy—its electoral incentives, its
procedural inclusiveness, and its structural responsiveness—give it greater
institutional competence to assess optimality in federalism. Congress will not reach
98
99

SUP. C T. R. 37.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (prohibiting bribery of public officials and witnesses).
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the perfect result in all cases because it will have imperfect information in all cases,
but its claim to legitimacy in the effort is greater than the Supreme Court’s.
All of that said, the Supreme Court can be useful in policing the extremes.
Notwithstanding the Senate’s structural protection of state interests, national
regulation still requires only a majority of state majorities to acquiesce. It is
therefore possible that the national government will take power in cases in which
state or regional majorities with intense preferences would benefit more from state
power than the national majority would benefit from national power. When that kind
of case transparently occurs, the Supreme Court can usefully intervene. Of course,
the Court might well make mistakes, deviating from first-best optimality and
invalidating laws that should stand. But as long as the Court continues to apply a
relatively deferential standard of review (as it currently does), the mistakes should
be few and minor.
As a final note, it is worth repeating that cost-benefit theory suggests one
generalization for when national power should be allowed—the subjective-objective
distinction—and that distinction is one that the Supreme Court probably can
administer fairly easily. Legislators’ motivations for regulating might be somewhat
obscure and certainly will be harder for the Court to assess than for the legislators
themselves to understand. But in extreme cases in which legislators justify their
regulations solely in subjective terms (and in which collective action problems seem
minor), the Court can usefully send the regime back to the states.100
IV. COST-BENEFIT FEDERALISM AND OBAMACARE’S INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE
What does the cost-benefit theory suggest about the Obamacare litigation and
the constitutionality of the individual mandate? Whether analyzed under the
commerce power or the taxing power, the question for cost-benefit federalism is
whether the individual mandate produces enough efficiency gains to offset its
libertarian losses. That question, though, should also take account of the statute’s
political federalism—its preservation of state power within the national regulatory
regime. This Part101 argues that the litigants and commentators in the Obamacare
case have exaggerated all three of those factors. Because the individual mandate
preserves far more state power than commentators have recognized, the provision
gains much less for efficiency than collective action federalists have asserted and
costs much less for liberty than libertarian federalists have asserted. Overall, though,
the statute strikes a rational federalist balance and deserves the Supreme Court’s
deference.
100
This rule for federalism also makes some sense of the Supreme Court’s choice to scrutinize
legislative findings in Commerce Clause cases. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
101
Throughout this Part, I will borrow heavily from two amicus briefs that my students and I coauthored for the Supreme Court litigation, under the supervision of attorneys Andrew Fischer and
Kevin Outterson. See Brief of Amici Curiae Jewish Alliance for Law & Social Action (JALSA),
Jewish Council on Urban Affairs (JCUA), Jewish Social Policy Action Network (JSPAN), New
England Jewish Labor Committee (JLC), & Professor Abigail R. Moncrieff in Support of Petitioners
on the Individual Liberty Implications of the Minimum Coverage Provision, Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 160243 [hereinafter JALSA
Brief]; Brief Amici Curiae of Prescription Policy Choices, Professors of Law, & Professors of Health
Policy in Support of Petitioners on the Minimum Coverage Provision, Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 160229 [hereinafter PPC Brief]. I thank
Andrew and Kevin, as well as students David Arnold, Julia Mirabella, Zoë Sajor, Rachel Smit, Kyle
Thomson, Hao Wang, and Emily Westfall, for their contributions to this research.
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A. STATE POWER UNDER OBAMACARE (AND BEFORE)
Most of the exaggeration of Obamacare’s federalism derives from a
misunderstanding of the degree to which Obamacare centralizes regulatory
authority.102 Perhaps because the version of healthcare reform that emerged from
Congress was the Senate’s instead of the House’s,103 the statute preserves much of
the preexisting state authority over insurance regulation, and it charges the states
with administering many of the statute’s new programs and rules. Obamacare thus
preserves significant opportunities for interstate competition and diversification
through both of the avenues described above. It is incompletely preemptive, and it
incorporates state administration through cooperative federalism.
First, although Obamacare obviously includes many new national insurance
regulations—the prohibitions on preexisting condition exclusions, contract
rescissions, benefit caps, medical underwriting, etc.104—it preserves some of the
states’ most important regulatory tools—their exclusive power over insurance
licensure,105 their corresponding immunity from federal antitrust enforcement,106 and
their traditional power to review insurance rates.107 Under Obamacare, thus, a state
may refuse to license any given insurance company to write and sell policies within
its borders, even if the insurance company complies fully with national regulations.
The states thus possess—and retain under Obamacare—an absolute power of
exclusion that they can use to control the health insurance products available to their
citizens. Moreover, after extensive state lobbying during the passage of the ACA,
Congress opted not to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act,108 which continues to
exempt insurance from federal antitrust regulations.109 Any state that chooses to do
so may create an insurance monopoly or oligopoly within its borders without fear of
federal intervention. Obamacare is thus a classic example of narrowly preemptive
national floor-setting. The states obviously cannot make it legally permissible for
insurance companies to violate Obamacare’s substantive regulations, but they may
impose additional requirements on insurance companies and may refuse to allow
noncompliant insurance products to be sold within their borders.
Second, even with respect to the new national insurance regulations (the new
national floor), Obamacare places primary enforcement authority with the states.110
The insurance regulations, thus, resemble the criminal law situation described above.
Because the states retain primary authority to oversee their own insurance markets,
102
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, merely asserted without citation or elaboration “that the
individual mandate supersedes a multitude of the states’ policy choices in these key areas of
traditional state concern.” Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar.
26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28,
2012).
103
Compare Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010)
(Senate version of the bill), with America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200
(2009), Title II, Subtitle A, available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h3200/text.
104
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1-1–19a (2012).
105
Christopher C. Jennings & Katherine J. Hayes, Health Insurance Reform and the Tensions of
Federalism, 362 NEW E NG . J. M ED . 2244, 2245 (2010) (noting that states will continue licensing
insurers).
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See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006).
107
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-94 (West 2012).
108
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
109
See Jonathan Dinan, Shaping Health Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 41 PUBLIUS 395, 399, 412-13 (2011).
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42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-22.
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consistently, of course, with the national substantive law, they retain a lever that
they can use to influence national policy-making. As in the criminal law context, the
national government has the power to step in if the states fail, but the states’ primary
enforcement power preserves some advantages of libertarian federalism.
Third, Obamacare also engages the states in the administration of many of the
statute’s regulatory innovations, following the standard model of cooperative
federalism. Even with respect to Congress’s new programs, therefore, the states
retain a role in shaping policy. The “American Health Benefit Exchanges” are the
best-known examples of this cooperative federalist structure in Obamacare;111 the
statute charges the states with implementing the exchanges and provides tremendous
flexibility for state diversification.112 But the statute also provides for “state
innovation waivers” that allow for cooperative federalism in nearly all aspects of the
Obamacare regulatory world.113 Indeed, the waiver provision empowers HHS to
excuse individual states from most of Obamacare’s regulatory requirements, as long
as the state comes up with a different way to achieve comparable results.
Finally, it is important to note the limited scope of Obamacare’s “national
takeover” relative to the status quo ante. The pre-Obamacare world was not one of
state exclusivity or even of clear state primacy in health insurance regulation. All of
our various insurance markets were already subject to some national regulation
before Obamacare was even conceived: regulation for everyone over the age of
sixty-five was exclusively national under Medicare.114 Regulation for many people
living just above, at, or under the Federal Poverty Line was significantly national
under Medicaid.115 Regulation for employer-sponsored insurance through selfinsured employers was exclusively national under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).116 And regulation for individual and small-group
coverage was partly national under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996.117 The only sectors of health insurance that were not
subject to national regulation before Obamacare were fully insured employersponsored coverage and self-insured individual coverage (i.e., the uninsured).118
Those two markets are the only two that Obamacare “took over” from a status quo
ante of primary state control.

111

Id. § 18031.
See generally Jon Kingsdale & John Bertko, Insurance Exchanges Under Health Reform: Six
Design Issues for the States, 29 HEALTH AFF . 1158 (2010); State Actions to Implement Health
Exchanges, NAT ’L CONF. OF STATE LEGS. (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health-benefit-exch.aspx (demonstrating that the states
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implementing exchanges).
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42 U.S.C.A. § 18052; see also Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The
Affordable Care Act: Supporting Innovation, Empowering States (Feb. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/28/fact-sheet-affordable-care-actsupportinginnovation-empowering-states.
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See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006).
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Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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See generally Russell Korobkin, The Battle of Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good
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B. OBAMACARE AND REGULATORY EFFICIENCY
With that picture of Obamacare’s federalism, what can we say about the
statute’s gains for regulatory efficiency? Does it alleviate or prevent problematic
interstate externalities in the relevant markets? The answer is that it undoubtedly
does, but the individual mandate is less necessary and less effective than collective
action federalists have asserted. Indeed, most of the statute’s corrections of interstate
collective action problems come from the insurance regulations, not the mandate.119
The standard account for why the individual mandate is necessary is that it
solves adverse selection. Once Obamacare’s insurance reforms go into effect, the
argument goes, insurance companies will no longer be allowed to deny coverage to
patients who wait until they are sick to buy insurance, allowing individuals to freeride on the system by refusing to pay into insurance until they need to take out of
it.120 The individual mandate addresses that problem by imposing a financial
incentive to encourage regular participation in insurance pools, regardless of one’s
current health.121
This story is undoubtedly right, but it is a story of collective action problems
among individuals, not collective action problems among states. The federalism
question ought to be whether the state governments are separately incompetent to
solve this market-based problem of adverse selection. With respect to the insurance
market regulations (the prohibitions on preexisting condition exclusions and such),
the answer is that the states suffer from significant externalities that render them
incapable of regulating efficiently. Before Obamacare, the states that attempted to
ban the same insurance practices and to impose community rating lost insurance
companies to other, laxer states.122 Furthermore, a rational state might under-impose
and under-enforce such requirements out of a concern that generous insurance laws
would attract sick and costly residents to their jurisdictions. The insurance market
reforms, thus, need to be national.
But no one is challenging those regulations. Indeed, under the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters,123 there is no doubt that
Congress has constitutional authority to regulate the contents and practices of any
insurance contract bought or sold in the United States. The only question in the
Obamacare litigation is whether the additional incentive for individuals to maintain
insurance coverage—the “Minimum Essential Coverage Provision”124 or “individual
mandate”—is constitutionally permissible.
If that provision is, as the government has primarily argued, an attempt to solve
the adverse selection problems that will arise from Obamacare’s insurance
regulations, then it probably does not need to be a national regulation. National
regulation is necessary when an individual state’s incentive to regulate is distorted
relative to the collective, national optimum. Once Obamacare’s unquestionably
119
Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1–19a (West 2012) (insurance regulations), with 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A (West 2012) (individual mandate).
120
See generally Siegel, supra note 4. See also Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage
Provision), Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2012).
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See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.
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(Council for Affordable Health Ins. & Heartland Inst. eds., 2005), available at
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322 U.S. 533 (1944).
124
ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A).

COST-BENEFIT FEDERALISM

321

constitutional insurance regulations become effective nationwide, the states’
incentives to fix adverse selection within their borders will align with the national
optimum. Any state that fails to impose an individual mandate or otherwise to solve
adverse selection will lose insurers to regulating states. Good insurance companies
will refuse to do business in states that refuse to require individual insurance
coverage. That is, the externality of insurance companies moving from nonregulating states to regulating states will push the states towards (not away from) the
presumed national optimum of imposing an individual mandate.
Of course, if one state refuses to do anything about adverse selection and loses
its insurers to competing states, that state’s uninsured and underinsured populations
will impose some costs on other states. Those populations will be sicker than the
average American and will therefore consume more healthcare than average when
they travel to other states, draining the other states’ healthcare systems. Self-insured
individuals will also probably experience worse health outcomes later in life,
imposing costs on other states through national Medicare taxes.125 We can also
imagine that at least one insurance company will bravely stay in the holdout state
and will simply charge higher rates for insurance there, and some of that insurer’s
higher costs might spill over into other states through the insurance company’s
national financial structure. There will, therefore, be some interstate externalities
that will allow the holdout state to avoid the full cost of its refusal to impose a
mandate. All of those avoided costs, though, will likely pale in comparison to the
unavoidable cost of losing good insurers.
Furthermore, because insurance pools remain state-specific after Obamacare
(because the exchanges are state-run) and because the states retain many of their
traditional powers over insurance regulation, the states that do mandate coverage
will be able to combat adverse selection-related externalities from the states that do
not mandate coverage. Imagine, for example, that Aetna chooses to continue writing
and selling policies in a state that refuses to pass an individual mandate. The adverse
selection costs that Aetna incurs in the non-regulating state will not flow naturally to
the regulating states through the insurance pool because the risk pools themselves
are state segregated. Aetna might nevertheless try to offset the costs of selling
insurance in a non-regulating state, at least in part, by raising its prices in states with
mandates. But the regulating states have authority to prevent Aetna from raising
rates within their borders. Because they retain power over rate-setting, they can
require Aetna to charge the minimum premium necessary to cover the costs of
insuring their own residents. Of course, the non-regulating states might create risks
for Aetna’s overall solvency—a risk that will not be state-specific—but the
probability of problems arising from that externality is likely quite small. If selling
insurance in a mandate-free state starts to threaten Aetna’s solvency, Aetna will stop
selling insurance in that state.126
In the end, then, although the insurance regulations undoubtedly improve
regulatory efficiency and ought to be national and although the individual mandate
will cause some externalities (as all regulations do), the individual mandate does not
clearly require national uniformity. The states will need to figure out a way to
address adverse selection once the insurance reforms go into effect. Perhaps, if
structural libertarian costs of nationalization are significant, the states ought to be
125
See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action
in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 C OLUM . L. R EV. 844 (2009) (describing the externalization
problems that arise from federal spending programs like Medicare and Medicaid).
126
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permitted greater autonomy to design a solution than Obamacare’s waiver provision
allows.
All of that said, adverse selection is not the only reason to have an individual
mandate, and the other justification for the provision more clearly benefits from
national implementation. The other reason that Congress passed the mandate was to
eliminate the market for self-insured healthcare transactions—for healthcare
purchased at the point-of-service without third-party insurance—by shifting all
patients into the more-efficient substitute market for healthcare transactions
purchased with third-party insurance.127 The market for self-insured healthcare is an
interstate commercial market, and the elimination of that market—like the
elimination of the market for recreational marijuana128—probably requires national
action. The problem is that no state has a full incentive to prosecute individuals for
failure to purchase insurance if many of their inefficient healthcare transactions will
occur in other states.
This argument, though stronger in my view than the adverse selection argument,
is also somewhat overblown in the literature and in the briefs.129 In their persistent
references to inefficient emergency room care and to medical bankruptcies in the
United States, the individual mandate’s proponents exaggerate the extent to which a
state can avoid the costs of its self-insured citizens’ inefficient healthcare
transactions. An individual who fails to save enough for needed medical care and
then consumes medical care anyway imposes significant costs on her home
economy. Emergency rooms are required to provide treatment regardless of the
patient’s ability to pay, but they are not required to provide that treatment for free.130
Even a self-insured patient who travels to a different state to consume
uncompensated emergency room care thus carries the cost of her choice home in the
form of a hefty bill. If she takes advantage of federal bankruptcy protections to avoid
that bill, she and her home economy still suffer from her debt and divestment of
assets.
As in the adverse selection case and as in all regulatory cases, there are
undoubtedly interstate externalities associated with the market for self-insured
healthcare transactions. The case for national action and regulatory efficiency,
however, seems somewhat weaker than the collective action federalists have made it
out to be. The statute’s efficiency gains will be less dramatic than collective action
federalists have asserted.
C. OBAMACARE AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
What about the liberty costs of the individual mandate? Does Obamacare
threaten structural liberty in a way that matters for regional majorities or for
government accountability? Although the statute obviously sets the individual
127
Congress asserted in two findings that the individual mandate would “increase the number and
share of Americans who are insured,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(C) (West 2012), and would achieve
“near-universal coverage,” id. § 18091(a)(2)(D). The next finding noted that “[t]he economy loses up
to $207 [billion] a year because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured” and that
near-universal coverage “will significantly reduce this economic cost.” Id. § 18091(a)(2)(E). Even
without the explicit acknowledgement in § 18091(a)(2)(E) that Congress’s goal is to eliminate selfinsurance, the stated goal of near-universal coverage in § 18091(a)(2)(C)-(D) supports the notion that
Congress sought to eliminate the self-insured market.
128
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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See PPC Brief, supra note 101.
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See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
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mandate as a default rule for all states and although some state majorities have
vociferously opposed that default rule through their state attorneys general, the
statute’s libertarian costs are much less severe than the litigants and commentators
have made them out to be.
The most important point here is that the individual mandate does not, contrary
to the Eleventh Circuit’s characterization,131 require individuals to purchase health
insurance. It is instead merely a requirement that all individuals contribute some
money to the American healthcare infrastructure, either by paying into a private
insurance pool or by making an equivalent or lesser payment to the national fisc.132
The penalty for failure to carry insurance coverage is defined as a “shared
responsibility payment,” and it is statutorily calibrated to the average price of the
least-comprehensive level of private insurance.133 Individuals who choose to give
their money to the government instead of giving it to an insurance pool will face no
financial penalty for their choice. They will simply forego the insurance coverage
that they could have purchased with the same money. In this sense, then, the
individual mandate is functionally indistinguishable from an ordinary tax.134
The question, then, is whether state power has significant libertarian advantages
for simple taxation—or, more precisely, for targeted taxation intended to support a
discrete private industry. As there are in all regulatory regimes, there are
undoubtedly some structural libertarian benefits to leaving this kind of taxation to
the states. Some individuals apparently feel strongly that they should not be required
to support the healthcare infrastructure or to pay for others’ access to needed
medical services. Those individuals will have better structural protection if the states
are allowed to diverge in their approaches to healthcare financing without the
national restrictions and oversight that come with Obamacare’s waiver provision.
Individuals who strongly oppose redistributive policy in healthcare would have
better opportunities for diversity, voice, and exit if the states were in charge in this
case, just as they would if the states were in charge in any given case.
Furthermore, there is a reasonable chance that the individual mandate arose
from something like a factional or interest-group-oriented legislative process. The
mandate was essentially the price the insurance industry exacted for acquiescing in
Obamacare’s insurance market reforms. The mandate might, therefore, represent an
externality from a ruling class of insurance companies onto an under-represented
minority population of uninsured Americans. Those uninsured Americans could gain
better representation for their views and perhaps better structural protection against
industry-driven legislation (through interstate competition as well as diversity, voice,
and exit) if the states were in charge.

131
See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 129192 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603
(2011) (mem.), and cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27,
2012), and cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012)
(“Individuals subjected to this economic mandate have not made a voluntary choice to enter the
stream of commerce, but instead are having that choice imposed upon them by the federal
government.”); id. at 1328 (“This economic mandate represents a wholly novel and potentially
unbounded assertion of congressional authority: the ability to compel Americans to buy an expensive
health insurance product they have elected not to buy . . . .”).
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Beyond these general libertarian costs, however, there is nothing particularly
troubling about the individual mandate. It is simply a tax. That said, the strongest
objections to Obamacare do seem to center on subjective preferences rather than
objective needs. The voters who oppose the mandate do not seem to object merely to
the financial cost of buying insurance coverage; they seem opposed to the principle
of governmental insurance mandates. The problem, though, is that their subjective
opposition is based on a faulty characterization of the law’s effect. Obamacare does
not, in fact, force individual Americans to buy private insurance policies or
otherwise to “enter the stream of commerce”135—except insofar as all taxes require
Americans to support commerce. Of course, some of the bill’s opponents might
object generally to taxation and might therefore seek libertarian federalism so that
they can live in low-tax states. But if that libertarian cost of nationalization were
sufficient to support invalidation under Article I, then no national law should be
allowed. All such laws require financial support, which requires national taxation.
In short, the libertarian costs from the individual mandate are non-zero, but they
are not nearly as high as the law’s opponents believe. The mandate imposes no more
on freedom than any ordinary tax, and although state power certainly provides
libertarian advantages for taxation, there is no unique or particularly compelling
need for state power in this regime.
D. OBAMACARE AND RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Of the three preceding subsections, perhaps the most important for judicial
review under Article I—and the least appreciated and least discussed aspect of
Obamacare in the litigation briefing so far—is the first subsection, on Obamacare’s
many preservations of state power. To the extent that Obamacare requires
individuals to buy insurance, it allows states significant authority to control the kinds
of insurance available for compliance with that requirement. Indeed, HHS has
decided that it will not even exercise its statutory authority to define the minimum
benefits package required, leaving most benefits regulation to the states.136
Although, as this Part has demonstrated, there are arguments to be made for both the
efficiency benefits and the libertarian costs of the Obamacare statute, the most
compelling point under rational basis review is that Congress struck a reasonable
balance between national and state power. The national government did not
monopolize either insurance or healthcare regulation, nor did it allow states to
monopolize either regulatory regime. Given the impossibility of determining what
the optimal federalist balance is for these regimes, the duly enacted and
democratically legitimate Obamacare statute deserves the Supreme Court’s
deference.
V. CONCLUSION
Both of the extreme visions of federalism that have emerged in the Obamacare
litigation rest on sound premises, but either theory taken alone would argue for the
end of federalism. The first-best theory of American federalism would optimize the
balance between the national government’s efficiency advantages and the state
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governments’ libertarian advantages. It would seek the optimal cost-benefit balance
between state and national governance. Because that optimal balance is impossible
to discern, however, and because Congress is structurally better situated to gather the
imperfect information that exists about regulatory costs and benefits, courts engaged
in constitutional review should largely defer to legislative decisions.
In the Obamacare litigation, all of the factors that are relevant to cost-benefit
federalism have been largely overblown. The individual mandate does not create as
many efficiency benefits as collective action federalists claim; it does not create as
many libertarian costs as libertarian federalists claim; and it generally does not
nationalize healthcare or health insurance policy as much as the litigants and
commentators claim. It is, at minimum, a moderate and rational—if not entirely
optimal—federal statute that creates some efficiencies without sacrificing too much
liberty. The Court therefore ought to defer to Congress’s rational judgment and
uphold the statute.

